

SECRET

NO # 304-15

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

18 February 1975.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : The [] Contract on Soviet Perceptions

1. Attached is [] Memorandum for the Record on the \$1 million contract allocated to a firm called [] to do a study on "Soviet perceptions" which I mentioned at the 18 February Executive Committee meeting.

2. As I indicated, this contract troubles me for it is the type of activity I regard as almost prima facie a waste of taxpayer funds. The usual drill in such matters is that the outside contractor comes to intelligence analysts and other knowledgeable officers within the U.S. Government, picks their brains and then repackages their thoughts -- sometimes diluting or distorting these thoughts in the process of packaging. Thus the end result is an inferior version of information already known to the U.S. Government which, in addition to the overt cost, carries the added charge of the time and attention of the government employees consulted during the preparation of such a document.

3. I am not contesting the patently obvious importance of creative analysis of Soviet perceptions. I do question the utility or wisdom of this kind of approach to the problem. Also, in an era of declining resources, this kind of superfluous "research" strikes me as one sphere in which drastic savings can be achieved without any diminution of quality or necessary work. I realize that the funds involved in this particular project do not come from the intelligence budget and, hence, do not relate to expenditures over which you have any degree of say or control. Nonetheless, this is an almost perfect example of the sort of financial and resource drain that should be

[]

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

25X1
25X1

curtailed if not stopped. If you share these views, you might want to make at least an informal protest to the Secretary of Defense, though you should probably not do so until you have the benefit of the analysis of the [] approach which [] is preparing.

[]

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

25X1

[]
Copy No.

Copy No. 8 - DDCI
Copy No. 9 - DDI
Copy No. 10 - DDS&T
Copy No. 11 - DDO
Copy No. 12 - DDA
Copy No. 13 - D/DCI/IC ✓
Copy No. 14 - D/NIO Chrono

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

Office of the Director

14 February 1975

Copy 213

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ☐ Contract on "Soviet Perceptions"

1. On 11 February a meeting was held with ☐ and Defense Nuclear Agency representatives to discuss ☐ study contract on "Soviet perceptions." The contracting agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, has allocated \$1,000,000 for the ☐ study effort this year.

2. The contract was instigated by Andy Marshall. The DNA representatives' explanation of the substantive relationship between his agency's mission and "Soviet perceptions" still did not make clear why a non-intelligence agency should handle a contract for an intelligence study. The study concept stems from Andy Marshall's conviction that in the far reaches of unpublished COMINT data lie clues as to the locus of Soviet defense decisionmaking in the bureaucracy and the basis for such decisions.

3. The contractor envisions using the first million dollars to define the problem. The study concept as explained by ☐ is to position contractor personnel at NSA working for and with NSA analysts. This effort is called a "direct approach" to the study contract objective, that is, a search for direct evidence about Soviet perceptions and motivations for defense decisions. In a parallel effort they will pursue the "indirect approach" (the traditional approach of intelligence analysts) that is, an attempt to infer Soviet perceptions and decisions from objective evidence. The ☐ representative characterized the meeting with CIA as part of the vital first step to success of the study--"building bridges to the intelligence agencies." The bridge to NSA has already been built in that, according to ☐ ☐ had pledged the cooperation of his agency.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

25X1

25X1

SUBJECT: ☐ Contract on "Soviet Perceptions"

25X1

4. As for the study concept--Andy Marshall's conviction that in COMINT are unexploited clues which will unfold the Soviet decisionmaking process as not something new. From his position on the NSC staff he had CIA and NSA do a study on the SS-9 based on that same conviction. The extensive efforts of CIA and NSA did not turn up such clues. I cited this previous effort, but ☐ claimed the study was defective in its approach.

25X1

5. The DNA representative spoke of net assessments as though they were recent analytical innovations. Also, the same note was struck by ☐ in asking about what CIA was doing in analyzing perceptions. I asserted that "net assessments" and "perceptions" were fairly recent buzz words but did not represent new techniques. Net assessments by other names have long been part of the defense planning process. Also, attempting to appreciate Soviet "perceptions" is part of the logic model of every intelligence analyst. By issuing national intelligence publications covering Soviet perceptions of Western Europe and Soviet images of the US we were already concentrating on the "perceptions" part of the analytical discipline. Nevertheless, I said, a concerted effort in examining COMINT might yield some new appreciations on the subject.

25X1


6. I have low expectations for the results of the study. All but one of the ☐ participants are scientists and engineers. They require a year of education in intelligence, called assessing the problem. To reconstruct Soviet perceptions or the decisionmaking process, a more effective study group would be one composed of the range of disciplines represented by the people who probably make up the Soviet policy and decisionmaking apparatus. In addition, I do not share Andy Marchall's high expectations about the results of in-depth exploitation of COMINT. Finally, even if the effort were successful in providing a precise description of past Soviet decisions, for example, their purposes in building the five new ballistic missile systems now being tested, I question the impact of such findings on US defense policy. In the US and in the USSR, defense planning decisions involve a complex of "perceptions," some persistent, some transitory and many non-military.

25X1

25X1





25X1

SUBJECT:  Contract on "Soviet Perceptions"

25X1

25X1

7. I am not Horatio at the  bridge to CIA, but I do not believe the Agency should commit many resources to support the study. I believe a million dollars worth of CIA or DIA analysts at the NSA facility would be a better use of the contract money. Since the money is committed, I would like to see the effort as an  pilot study with the objective of evaluating COMINT for the purposes Andy Marshall has in mind. However, we probably will not have any influence over the course of the study. In any case, it seems to me that the bridges to intelligence agency participants in such a contract should be built before rather than after the contract is let.

25X1



Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

25X1



Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

25X1

25X1 SUBJECT: Contract on "Soviet Perceptions"

Distribution:

- Cy 1 - NIO/SP
- 2 - D/DCI/NIO
- 3 - NIO/CF
- 4 - NIO/USSR
- 5 - NIO/SA
- 6 - OSR/SEC
- 7 - NIO/RI

25X1

25X1 NIO/SP: (14Feb75)

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600010006-6

25X1